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After the epoch of Descartes, a new character occupies the philosophical scene: the self (whereas other characters are eclipsed, like the agent intellect and soon the soul). Where does it come from? By what alchemy have the philosophers succeeded in extracting from the vulgar material that is our ordinary speech about oneself this philosophical being that we willingly qualify as a "pure self" (das reine Ich)?
Ordinary language knows two uses of the French word "self" (moi). As a personal pronoun of the first person singular, it can serve as complement to a verb ("tell me about it/him") as well as reinforces in apposition the subject of the phrase ("Me, I think," ego cogito). 2 Furthermore, it can lose its pronominal status (and therefore its referential function) by becoming an adjective designating a quality of self-presence (like when we say after a furious outburst: "I was no longer myself").
After the seventeenth century, the language of philosophers adds to these two uses a new meaning: to designate, as a noun, the subject of certain remarkable actions. Because it is assuredly about a subject in the sense of an agent that we can say of it things like: "the self posits itself absolutely,"
3 "the self exists for itself only insofar as it knows itself, and knows itself only insofar as it acts" 4 (and we could multiply examples of operations attributed to a subject -the self -whose activity philosophy attempts to describe, paradoxically, in the third person).
Thus there would be some operations in which the subject could only be identified as a self, whether as someone's self or as nothing more than the self. But we fall then into an embarrassing situation, because we have the feeling that the ordinary system of grammatical persons does not allow us to locate this self in the place which ought to be its own. It would be necessary by identifying someone. And if we pose the question of identity in the second person ("Who are you?"), we wait for an answer that allows us to speak about our interlocutor in the third person by naming him.
We suppose that the answer to our question about someone's identity is "It's me" ("C'est moi"). What are the transformations by which the philosophy of the self succeeds in exchanging this answer, "It's me," for an answer mentioning a being who calls itself the self?
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The Logic of the Egoitistical Sentence
Now what about the second use, mentioned above, of the self taken substantively, the one in which it designates the thinking self given to itself in its act of thinking? This is the self of the philosophical doctrines that we can bring together under the label of egology. At first sight, an egology is a philosophical form of egotism. It is a philosophy that not only expresses itself in the first person, but can express itself only in the first person. If the philosopher did not have the right to employ the words "self" and "I," he/she would not be able to formulate the argument of the Cogito.
In fact, the decisive time of the argument known by the name of the Cogito is when the philosopher expresses doubt as to his own identity. If this philosopher is Descartes, he will say: "I do not know if I am Descartes (the human individual named so by his parents), but I am certain that I exist as long as I am thinking." The reader is invited to apply this reasoning to himself, by inserting his own name where Descartes would have mentioned his own, if it were formulated as his own doubt. In Caesarean language, 6 this argument is impossible, because it would yield: Descartes does not know if Descartes is Descartes, but Descartes is certain that Descartes exists as long as he is thinking.
It seems then that the philosophy of the Cogito is a philosophy in the first person. Additionally, it begins by an interrogation of what the philosopher is when he thinks in the first person and is reduced to this activity of thinking. Therefore we could judge that it is a philosophical egotism. And it is often in this way that the Cartesian innovation has been presented: a metaphysician dares to take to speaking in the first person.
However, there is room to wonder if an egological doctrine is able to maintain the egotist style through and through. It is a fact that it begins in the first person. But the time comes when it exchanges the pronoun "I" (moi) for the substantive "the self" (le moi). This substantive is supposed to refer to something that will be elucidated in the third person. Consequently, the style of egology ceases to be egotistical, and there we can discern in it the adoption of a manner of speaking that forbids taking for the self (soi) (by saying "I" [moi] ) what we say about the self (moi). Egology, contrary to appearances, could indeed express itself in a form of "Caesarean idiom," not for reasons of civility or morality (as with the Jansenist style), but for metaphysical reasons. I propose to brand it the "transcendental Caesarian idiom."
These metaphysical reasons presuppose an analysis of the egotistical sentence, which is understood as a sentence starting with "I." It is therefore necessary to attack this analysis in order to decide if we understand what the self means in the sense of the philosophers of egology.
What is an "egology"?
What is called, in the technical vocabulary of the philosophers, an egology? This term is the name that Husserl gives to a discipline that must found philosophy. 7 Ricoeur gives this explanation: Husserl, in his transcendental philosophy, wanted to elaborate "a philosophy that would be only an egology and never an ontology."
8 In other words, this philosophy would remain thoroughly phenomenological, a description of a lived experience giving rise to concepts, without ever passing through a thesis on what hings are independently from us and from the manner in which they present themselves to us. Ricoeur clarifies: "An egology, that is a cogito without res cogitans […] ." 9 If we hold ourselves to this definition, Descartes, inasmuch as he makes the ego into a thinking thing, is still not a thinker of egology, but only the precursor of such a doctrine. Here, a thinking thing is to be taken in the strongest sense of a thinking substance.
Therefore, egology is what the philosophy of the Cogito becomes when it imposes on itself a methodical requirement whose watchwords are given by phenomenology: can I indicate what is the given experience that enables me to describe what I describe (here, myself [moi-même]) as I am doing it? From then on, the philosopher who resumes, in turn, the Cogito must ask himself: does this act of thinking present me to myself as an immaterial substance?
The answer is that consciousness does not give this evidence of a thinking subject who would have existed before the act of thinking or who would persist in existing after this act. Moreover, Descartes recognizes it (at this stage of his development [cheminement] in the Meditations): I am certain of existing as long as I am thinking, but this certainty does not surpass the present. As he writes it in the Second Meditation:
I am, I exist: that is certain; but for how long? Namely, for as long as I am thinking, because perhaps it could be, if I were to cease thinking, that I would cease being or existing at the same time (AT, IX, 21).
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The (Negative) Egology of Descartes Descartes, in the eyes of the philosophers of the subject who have succeeded him, would remain prisoner to a metaphysics of substance.
However, Merleau-Ponty pointed out that we find in the work of Descartes a non-"Cartesian" moment, if that means non-substantialist. Thus we can say, conforming to the definition suggested by Ricoeur, that we already find there an egological moment. This is the moment when Descartes does not yet know how to say what he is as a thinking subject, but only what he is not. For a time, Descartes escapes from the dogmas of "grand rationalism" and shows himself in a surprising fashion to be our contemporary, which Merleau-Ponty explains thusly:
He had described the mind as a being which is neither subtle matter, nor a breath of spirit, nor any existing thing, but a being which itself dwells in the absence of all positive certainty.
[…] It is in this respect that Descartes is more modern than the Cartesians, anticipating the philosophies of subjectivity and the negative. Merleau-Ponty, in this reading, sketches an interpretation of the Cartesian philosophy of mind as egology. An egology that we could say is apophatic or negative (like the theology that on the subject of God only authorizes the negative way and refuses to speak of him as we do of his creatures). We can say what the pure subject is not, but not what it is (except that it is thinking).
This reading calls for a remark in terms of our reflection on the egotistical sentence. The thinking subject is posited as a pure mind, which means that it is "not any existing thing." Merleau-Ponty writes that, as such, it "remains itself" even though it doubts. Yes, but how can it be itself, remain itself, be certain of remaining itself, even though it is not certain of anything (other than existing)? What is it when it is and remains itself? By hypothesis, it does not know anything of itself. Yet, remaining itself assumes that one remains the same thing (aliquid). If our egology must stay negative, how can it decide on the identity of the thinking subject? Such is the question that we cannot avoid posing when we find in the work of several contemporary philosophers this same exaltation of a purely phenomenological moment in Descartes' thought.
The what? And the who? In a Summer 1927 course, Heidegger would go as far as to forge a special term for designating the question of being posed about a person. Since Scholastic vocabulary provides the term "quiddity" -in German "die Washeit" -in order to designate the answer to the question, "What is that thing?", then we could say in German "die Werheit," literally the "being-who" or the "whoness" (quissité), in order to designate the answer to the question "Who is it?" (a question necessarily posed in regard to that which shares the same mode of being as us). "Who will do this work?", the answer may indeed be held in a personal pronoun, but it will not be "I" or "You," but rather "Me (Moi)," "You" (or, more completely "It's me who will do it," "It's you," etc.). 16 Thus it is necessary to say that in French the answer calls to the singular a Me (Moi) or a You (Toi).
Even more disturbing, a second perplexity stops us. In front of a thing, we ask what it is (question of quiddity). In front of a person, we ask who it is (question of Werheit). But, if the question about the being of a person is carried by the word "who?", it is a question of identity. Yet the answer that responds to a question of identity cannot be "I am myself," "You are yourself," "He is himself." We expect something like a proper name or a set of identifying descriptions ("I am Mr. So-and-so," "He is the plumber," etc.). Can such answers, like "I am a self" or "I am this self," therefore be considered identifying descriptions?
These difficulties, I believe, are inherent in the egological tradition, as can be confirmed by returning to Descartes.
Questions about an Untranslatable Question from Descartes
Heidegger has attracted attention to two ways of posing the question of "being" in regard to what is: one is reifying and the other is suited to the fact that we are dealing with someone, rather than something. According to him, when someone wonders about himself, about his own being, he must ask who 
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This sentence is notable in at least two regards.
On the one hand, the question posed is indeed conveyed by the word "quis?" and not by "quid?". If we follow Heidegger in his dichotomy, we could very well have here a sample of negative egology, of a thought of the self (soi) escaping from substantialism.
On the other hand, the question posed is in the first person, even though Descartes proceeds, inside of this sentence, to the substantification of the pronoun "ego." It had already come to him to write it in French in the Discourse on Method, where he speaks of "this self [moi] ." But when he said "this self" in that text, it was in order to identify himself immediately with the soul, so that he was speaking in the third person about it:
[…] From this I knew I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think, and which does not require any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist. Accordingly this 'I' [moi] -that is, the soul by which I am what I am -is entirely distinct from the body, and indeed is easier to know than the body, and would not fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did not exist (AT, VI, 33).
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Nevertheless, in the Second Meditation, Descartes questions himself about himself, this ego, in the first person. This surprising sentence from Descartes has exercised the interpretative talents of many interpreters, who have wanted to see there in Cartesian thought a phenomenological moment. Their glosses will help us to specify the principle of all egologies.
Étienne Balibar has noted that the French translations of this text are inexact. 20 The text says something that escapes them. However, he does not say this in order to reproach the translators for a misunderstanding about the text, but in order to highlight that the sentence is "untranslatable in French."
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In fact, he correctly notes, the sentence in question is not any more translatable (without loss) into Latin.
Why is this untranslatable? Because, he writes, the sentence is "undecidable" from the point of view of verbal persons. 22 Is it in the first person or the third person? We hesitate between "I wonder what this Ego is" and "I wonder who I am." Balibar explains that it would be necessary to be able to merge these two incompatible versions.
If we construct the verb "being" in the third person, we get: "I wonder what this Ego is which now necessarily is (or which we now necessarily know that it is)." If we translate it thus, our egological doctrine would frankly assume the substantification of the pronoun "I" (moi): it would be necessary to construct the sentence in the third person.
If instead we put the verb "being" in the first person, our sentence becomes: "I wonder who I am, if it is now necessarily true that I am." Here, egology looks to keep the egotistical style: it is about me (moi) that I will speak when, later, I will say that I am a pure mind and not a human being. About me (moi), that means: about the particular individual that I am.
In short, Balibar concludes, Descartes has written something in Latin that is rendered in French: "Who am I, I who am the one that now necessarily am" ("Qui suis-je moi ce lui qui suis maintenant nécessairement"). 23 What is, according to him, the problem that reveals this impossibility of translating? If the sentence mixes the two verbal persons in an inextricable way, it is because it wants to pose a question of essence (bearing on the nature of an ego) that is at the same time a question of identity (who am I?). A reader who has in mind Heidegger's theses on the difference between these two questions should conclude that it appears difficult to pose the question of identity without posing that of essence. This diagnosis will be confirmed if we now turn towards the meticulous commentary that Vincent Carraud has made on this same sentence.
Carraud, as well, focuses his commentary on the interior discrepancy of this sentence. The sentence is in the third person since the word "ego" is substantivized there, but it is also considered to be in the first person since the interrogative word "who?" is used here in the first person (who am I?, not who is it?). Descartes dares to make a solecism in Latin (a deliberate solecism, of course, and not a fault of Latin usage). Carraud writes that it would be necessary to translate: But I still do not quite understand who I am, this I (moi) who "am" necessarily from now on.
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This translation is obviously impossible.
Carraud insists on the fact that Descartes, in the Second Meditation, poses the question of identity before posing the question of essence. He even judges that Descartes opened -before closing it, of course -a "space" of phenomenological questioning, a space in which the question of being-self (l'être-soi) or being proper could be posed in a non-metaphysical way. 25 Thus we rediscover the idea of a Descartes who would be the precursor to the philosophies of existence that Merleau-Ponty put forward.
How does Carraud interpret the "ego ille" of Descartes? He rightly dismisses the construction of the "ego" as pronoun, followed by a relative one, as if one could say: "I (Moi), who am the one who…etc." In this case, he writes, the use would be a "pure designation" and it would be necessary to understand that it designates the author himself, Descartes.
26 But precisely, this cannot be the case. In fact, we have escaped from doubt only on a single point (ego sum, ego existo): all the rest is still struck with uncertainty. As he specifies further on: Descartes' self is not René Descartes (a human person), but is "the pure self," anticipating what Husserl calls "das reine Ego." Carraud concludes very accurately: "In other words, the self is not me." 27 And it is this which explains the "invention of the self," that is, the mutation by which the pronoun "ego" becomes a noun. Indeed we must understand that "the referent of the pronoun is not a particular, empirical person, René Descartes himself." 28 But if it is not Descartes, nor obviously anyone else, then who is it? The answer is that it is only the one who has victoriously resisted doubt: no more than one person in particular, a "personal ego," but an ego stipped of all its "determinations" -an ego that, for this reason, Carraud compares and contrasts to Pascal's self without qualities. 29 In this Cartesian ego remains only existence (which is not a determination) and the certainty of presently being in the process of thinking. However, if this ego is so little determined, is it still someone? The more we scrutinize Descartes' untranslatable sentence, the more it becomes difficult to understand how it poses, as the interpreters have insisted, a question of identity. Carraud sees in doubt's ascetic process a purification of the thought of oneself which, according to him, justifies the passage to the substantive. The thinker is no longer like a particular person; he is no more than a self.
Yet, if the answer to the posed question ("who am I?") is that I am a self, it remains to be known which one. And if the answer is that I am ego ille, this self in the process of thinking, it remains to be specified how to distinguish this latter self from the former and from all the others. Unless, of course, the operation does not make any sense
The Individuation of an Ego
Martial Guéroult explains why the self, which Descartes eventually reduces by the way of doubt, is neither a personal being nor an individual being. He writes this amazing commentary which deserves to be cited at length:
[…] For what does Descartes mean? He simply means this: What do I know if I am not deceived when I believe myself to be Descartes? Do not madmen believe themselves to be gourds, Louis XIII, or the Cardinal? Cannot the evil genius deceive me about my own individuality? Did not Mercury succeed, for an instant, in having Socius doubt his personal identity? But in order to be deceived in this case, I must at least be thinking; and since I am thinking, I exist, for in order to think one must exist. In brief, in order to be deceived about myself, it is not necessary that I be Socius, Descartes, the Cardinal, nor any such individual, nor even an individual or a person in general, but simply that I be "a thinking thing," meaning a self, or thinking subject in general: any kind of thinking essence, whatever.
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Therefore, Guéroult concludes, the Cogito does not at all prove the reality (real existence) of "my personal concrete self, but that of my thinking self in general, as a universal condition of all possible knowledge." 31 A difference is introduced here. On one hand, there is the "personal concrete self," who seems to be nothing other than the person of the philosopher (neither Louis XIII, nor the Cardinal, but me [moi]). On the other hand, there is the "thinking self in general," which is posed as a condition of the possibility for all knowledge and, in this sense, as having a "transcendental" status.
Let us first note that this historian's text allows us to attend the in vitro birth of the self, taken substantively in the metaphysical sense. It is here that the egological self enters the scene. Guéroult, reproducing what he judges to be Cartesian reasoning, begins from an initial finding: it is not impossible for Descartes to put in doubt "his own individuality" and to tell himself, "perhaps I am not Descartes." Starting from this possible doubt, philosophy frees up one certainty: even if I am deceived in thinking what I think, it does not hold any less that I am thinking. I am therefore a thinking thing. And that is when the pronoun taken substantively emerges: I am a thinking thing, that is, a self.
Is this derivation legitimate? Do we have here a "grammatical filiation" which could legitimate the fact of speaking about the self or the ego? Have we given a content to an assertion of the type, "I am a self"?
According to Guéroult, the legitimacy of this substantification is assured by the steps of methodical doubt. It is possible to doubt one's identity since it is possible to make an error about oneself. Descartes could deceive himself in believing to be Descartes. Guéroult imagines situations of madness of increasing seriousness: to pretend to be another person than oneself (Descartes pretending to be Louis XIII), to pretend to be something other than a person (a madman pretending to be a jug [cruche]
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). However, one would like to object to him; there is a difference between believing (wrongly) to be Louis XIII and not oneself (as we find in Descartes) and believing (wrongly) to be a jug and not a man. It would be an error to say: in both cases, there would be an error concerning the identity of the thinker. In fact, in the first case, the error would be about individuality, thus about personal identity (I am not one of the human beings that I believed myself to be, there is a misunderstanding about the person). On the other hand, in the second case, it would be firstly an error about my nature (I believe myself to be a jug). In fact, the madman's error is not in believing to be this jug, while he is really a jug, but not the one about which he says, "it's me (moi)." His error is more radical: it is to take himself to be a jug when he is a human being.
However, in order to apply this second possibility of error to Descartes' case, it is necessary to modify the content of it. The madman takes himself to be a jug. If Descartes were mad without having seen himself in that way -that happens to others, so why not to him? -and if he made an error about his nature, it would be necessary to say that he takes himself to be a human being even though he is something completely different, for example, a jug.
Yet we are not at the end of our troubles. It is already impossible to bring together all the examples of misunderstandings in a single genre of error about oneself, as if they formed increasingly accented degrees of error. But it remains more difficult still to understand on this scale of degrees of error about oneself what Guéroult has sketched: the passage from the error of taking oneself to be someone else or for something else to the error of taking oneself to be "an individual" or "a person in general." This new extension of the field of possible error (a field conceded to the evil Genius) obviously aims to prepare the victorious response: whatever my error may be, I am nonetheless the one who is deceived about himself, who must indeed exist if he is deceived, thus I am "a self, or thinking subject in general: any kind of thinking essence, whatever." Here is exactly the point which carries out the passage from the I (moi), who am deceived, to the thinking self. By a sort of philosophical alchemy, the purification of the pronoun "I" ("moi") by doubt delivers the substantive noun which allows the thinker to regain an identity:
In what would one have an identity there? Can one become aware of the demonstrative "this" in the definite description "this self"? Does Guéroult mean that the thinking subject can exist without being individuated? But, here, we want to ask: can I be a "subject in general"? Certainly not. To be a subject in general would be indeed to be a subject, but neither X, nor Y, nor any subject in particular. This would be like having an address in general, that is, living somewhere, yet not living in any place in particular. It can happen that I know I have an address in general without knowing what it is in particular. For example, someone could say: "Next month I will go to my friends' house in Venice." We would ask him: "Where in Venice?" And he would respond: "All that I know is that they live in Venice." This answer would not mean that two sorts of address exist: particular ones and those which are general (and thereby immaterial).
The indefectible hold that the subject has on itself (by means of the Cogito) is supposed to give it its premiere certainty: even though it could be mistaken about everything, it would be a thinking thing, since it is in the process of thinking. But this answer teaches us what I am (a thinking subject), it does not say who I am. And if I do not know anything more about the ego than that, there is no possibility of posing a question of identity, because we do not have any principle of identity for an entity described as "the thinker of this thought." Without such a principle, we cannot distinguish one particular subject from another.
To say that it is not necessary that I am "an individual or a person in general," is to say only: regardless of this particular subject that I am, and although I do not know which one of the subjects I am, I exist. In order to go further and pose the question of knowing which thinker I am, we would need a principle of individuation. But, as Guéroult underlines, Descartes did not provide this principle and, moreover, did not pose the problem of individuation.
What are we calling individuation here? The principle of individuation is indicated by giving the criterion of identity to a kind of beings, which makes it possible to conceive of an enumeration of those entities. For example, we have a criterion of identity for cats so that we can count how many of them are in the house at a given moment. To count them -and to avoid counting the same one several times -we must give a meaning to the predicates "being the same cat (already counted)" or "being another cat (not yet counted)."
In ordinary life, our principle of individuation for an ego passes through the physical person of the speaker. In other words, we do not have any other criterion for the person, in which to report who states an egotistical sentence, than that of the human being producing this sentence. Therefore, here the use of the word "self" as a substantive appears "metaphysical" in Wittgenstein's sense: all the conditions of an ordinary question of identity were refused, but the philosopher no longer gave the rules -thus in this case the criterion of identity -for the new use that he wanted to introduce.
The commentators who insist on the difference between a question of the type "who?" (question of identity) and a question of the type "what? what is it?" (question of essence) must explain to us how one can pose the question of the identity of a Cartesian ego when the latter, as they themselves underscore, is devoid of a principle of individuation. Ultimately, it seems that Luynes' translation was the only possible one: at this stage of the argument, the thinker cannot ask who he is (which person, that is, which one of the persons), but only what he must be in order to exist as thinker.
Does the egotistical sentence have a subject?
How can we explain that several recent interpretations of Descartes are capable of saying two seemingly incompatible things?
On one side, they say that Descartes had the merit of posing the question "who?" concerning the "I think." As long as Descartes poses this question of identity, he escapes the metaphysics of substance. On the other side, they say that Descartes had the merit of not confusing the "pure self" with a psychological or empirical "self," which would be basically the human individual with its particularities. The subject thinking the Cogito and thinking itself by way of the Cogito can be conceived only negatively. And we find it here in Guéroult's commentary: such an ego does not have any principle of individuation.
We can return to the strange sentence from the Meditations that they have commented on. As Balibar emphasized, it is disconcerting that this sentence, in order to be able to understand it, would need to be constructed at the same time in the first person (so that we must ask: quis sum?) and in the third person (so that it holds for ego ille, this self).
How can we get out of such an imbroglio? It is suitable, I think, to pose the radical question: does an egotistical sentence have a subject? I will answer this question by drawing inspiration from Anscombe's lecture on the first person. 33 She supports a position there that seemed eccentric: "I-thoughts" are thoughts without a subject. The remark was sometimes held to be paradoxical, but it is not intended to be paradoxical in any way; it only claims to formulate explicitly what is entailed in the use of the first person. It is a use that everyone knows very well and of which we must in any case get away from if we want to invent another use, for example, in order to respond to some philosophical demands.
Does an egotistical sentence have a subject? Let's specify firstly the meaning of the question, which concerns all sentences in the first person (the utterance of "I think, I exist," was only an example). Let's first set aside two false tracks.
1. Does an egotist sentence have a grammatical subject? Assuredly, at least in French. However, we know that the ending of the verb is enough in other languages, for example in Latin. ("Ambulo" translates "I walk," it does not need a word to supply a subject to the verb, and it is not the function of the "ego" if we specify "Ego ambulo.") However, every French sentence comprising a grammatical subject does not have necessarily, from the point of view of logic, a subject of predication. Example: in the sentence "it is raining," the function of the pronoun "it" does not reflect, by anaphora, an agent of raining. The sentence is, as we say, impersonal.
2. Does this mean that an egotistical sentence describes in reality an impersonal process, a "process without a subject"? Is a sentence without a subject necessarily an "impersonal" sentence (like "it is raining"). Is it a matter of refusing that the egotistical sentence says something about someone, namely very precisely about its author, the speaker who produces the sentence in question? Certainly not. It is very clear that the speaker who produces an utterance of the type "I walk" intends to say something about himself and wants us to understand him as having said something about himself.
Neither sentences lacking a grammatical subject, nor descriptions of process without a subject: must the egotistical sentences for all that be analyzable like predicative propositions, with the mention of a subject of predication and the application of a predicate to this referent? Specified thusly, the question is then: does the egotistical sentence have a subject in the logical sense?
It is convenient to start from an observation bearing on the traditional explanation of third person singular verbs. Littré takes up the definition from the Dictionnaire de l'Académie française of 1798 in the article PERSON:
Grammatical term. Persons, the diverse positions of beings in relation to the act of speech: the first person, the one who speaks; the second person, the one to whom one speaks; the third person, the one of whom one speaks. In this sense, person also applies to things: all objects of which we speak are in the third person.
If we took these definitions literally, we would run into a conceptual difficulty. We read actually that the person of which one speaks is, by definition, the third. If a sentence focuses on an object whatsoever, it is in the third person. If this is the case, how can we avoid this consequence: when the speaker talks about someone, he designates him ipso facto this position of "person of which one speaks" that signals the third person. When I am speaking of a person, I have to place him or her in the position of an object.
If this is the case, how will someone be able to speak of himself in the first person? It seems impossible to speak about oneself, that is to speak about the person who speaks, without making oneself (first person) into the object of which one speaks (third person). And it seems equally impossible to speak about the person to which one addresses oneself, the person that one calls to by saying to him "you." Speaking to someone in order to say something to him about himself: this would be to change the second person into the third person.
This difficulty that provokes the explanation of the word "person" as grammatical term reproduces a well-known difficulty that is inherent to the reflexive theory of subjectivity. The power of self-consciousness would rest upon the power that the thinking subject possesses of turning itself into an object -here, the passage to the third person -without for all that ceasing to be the subject of consciousness -there, the return to the first person.
It seems that there are only two conceivable ways of untying this conceptual knot: a) Accepting the apparent paradox, and thus attempting to accommodate a third person, a moment of objectification, in the heart of the first person. It is only necessary that to speak about oneself is to speak about an object, but about an object in which the speaker can identify himself. I am speaking about myself (moi): I am speaking about an object that appears to me as myself (moi), which is both a self and among all the selves, the one that belongs to me or that defines me. Philosophically, this is the solution of reflexive identity according to which a self defines itself as a subject-object, to repeat Fichte's expression. However, we then fall into the paradox of identity always lacking between the subject of the proposition (the subject of the utterance) and the one who speaks (the subject of enunciation). Speaking in the first person, and believing to speak about myself in the present, I speak in fact in the third person of a self from whom I just detached from myself by the simple fact of my being related to it.
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b) Refusing this solution on the grounds that it leads back to eliminating what made the first person original. In fact, adopting this solution would be treating the first person like a "third person in reserve." Reserved to whom? To the one who uses the word "self" in order to refer to himself, of course. Or more precisely, to refer to the only self that he knows directly and to which he can refer directly (his own). It is necessary then, if we wish to refuse that the first person is a variety of the third person, to analyze personal sentences (starting from "I" and "you") as being, from a logical point of view, sentences without a subject. This latter solution is essentially Anscombe's. It is judged paradoxical, but it seems to me that it only recalls what we have always understood since we learned to make use of egotistical forms.
Does the egotistical sentence speak about someone? Yes, but how does it do it? The sentence constructed with "I" really speaks about someone, but it does not say of whom, as a proposition containing a predicative connection (with a subject and a predicate) would do. What makes up the egotistical sentence, thanks to the markers of the first person, is referring the listener (or the reader) to a particular speech act, leaving it in his care, knowing this speech act, and determining who the author of it is.
The sentence starting with "you," in the same way, does not name the person about whom the sentence says something, but lets my interlocutor know -on the condition that he knows that this is his position in regard to our common speech act -he must apply to himself what my sentence says.
There is nothing paradoxical about a sentence that can have no subject while aiming to speak about someone. To say that it is without a subject is only to note that it does not say, by itself, of whom it is speaking. Indeed, the sentence speaks about someone, but it does not say about whom.
An example will help us be able to figure out what this is about. In the taking of the roll call, you are assisting in the execution of this formality of social life that involves taking attendance. The person in chart must verify who is there and note who is absent. He thus calls names from his list one after another: "Dupont? -Present! -Martin? -Present, etc." If you correctly hear (entendez) the whole of this exchange, you know who is there. Those responses mean each time: "I am present." But suppose that, seated where you are, you were only able to hear the responses, while you cannot hear the names called. Each time that a "Present!" is heard (se fait entendre), you know that someone is present without knowing who is present. On its own, the response "Present" does not say who is present if we separate it from the question "Is Mr. So-and-so present?" In the same way, taken by itself, the production of an egotistical sentence attests to a presence without identifying the one who is present.
The egotistical sentence does not say who the subject is that it speaks to us about. But the fact that it is in the first person indicates to the addressee how to determine it. How can it be done? It suffices to ask oneself: who is speaking? Knowing who is speaking, one is familiar with the unspoken subject of the egotistical sentence. Consequently, we see the subject, but we cannot give a subject to the sentence that starts with "I" without transforming it by completing it in such a way as to have it pass from the first to the third person. There are two familiar ways of carrying out this transformation.
1. The listener can use the technique of reported speech. Pierre says to me, "I will come." Knowing that the subject who spoke thusly was Pierre, I can report it back to you by saying, "Pierre said that he would be coming." In this case, it is I (moi) who names Pierre.
2. The speaker can respond in advance to his listener's request by introducing the third person into the egotistical sentence. In order to do this, he inserts his name into his egotistical sentence so as to identify who is speaking. I can say: "I (Moi), Vincent Descombes., I will come." You then find in the sentence all that is necessary to put the verb "to come" in the third person.
And this last possibility certainly gives us the key to Descartes' untranslatable sentence. Everything happens as if the egological theory were asking us to say: "I (Moi), this self, I will come." Everything happens as if it wanted to make the expression "this self" into the proper noun of the true subject inasmuch as this subject is not confused with the human being. What is egotism? Egotism is a style of presentation of oneself to others. It is a way of presenting oneself and hence of conducting oneself in company with others. The philosophy of egotism is also above all a rhetoric and a morality. Since saying "I" or "me" ("moi") is asking others to be concerned with one's own person, the question is posed of knowing if it is always well advised to do so (rhetoric) and if this is not unjust (morality). When can we do it and when is it necessary to avoid it?
As soon as an author says "I" ("moi"), 35 he asks us to turn our attention toward him in the sense of the human individual that he is. There is not any cause for doubt here that the word "I" refers to the human individual that I am. As for the self taken substantively (of which the moralists speak), it designates egotism's manifesting character trait, that is, the habit (manie) of speaking about oneself. The return of the substantive "I" to the pronoun thus comes about without difficulty: the attachment (attachment) to oneself is an attachment to the "empirical individual," to the particular human being.
On the other hand, philosophical egology makes use of the substantive "I" in view of instituting a dualism between the empirical individual and the "thinking subject in general." Yet this subject lacks a principle of individuation. How can we bring about the return from the noun to the pronoun if the ego ille that is supposed to attest to the act of thinking must not be the pronoun through which the speaker announces himself in first person?
The self of egology is something about which we cannot speak in the first person. I can speak about the egological self which is my own only in the third person. Thus, this egological self is not me (moi). And, as a result, I do not know how to reach it while starting from my own person, the one that I express in saying "I," the one I can identify for you by telling you my name.
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